Despite the assertion in the previous chapter that the divide between the global and the national no longer holds true, this chapter will deal where possible with the domestic context of change, leaving policy towards the global economy and the international context to Chapter 3. It deploys a somewhat blunt tripartite periodisation of the reform period: 1978 to 1984 is characterised as a period of policy reformulation; 1984 to 1994 as abandoning the old system; and the period after 1994 represents the (as yet) incomplete attempt to build a new system of macro economic control based on law and regulation rather than through state planning control.
remain central to the functioning of an economic system that has dysfunctionally emerged to suit their interests.
Changing bases of legitimacy
The start of the reform process in China is usually dated from the third plenum of the 11 th Central Committee in December 1978. Although Mao had died over two years previously, the continuation of Maoism without Mao -with modifications -under the leadership of Hua Guofeng means that the concept of the 'post-Mao era' often implicitly also starts in December 1978 rather than September 1976. Even though Hua Guofeng retained his chairmanship of the Party until 1981 (and the position of Premier until 1980) the third plenum marked the de facto transfer of power to Deng Xiaoping.
To be sure, Deng was not the only leader who favoured a rejection of the extremes of Maoism, and he was never an all powerful leader. His own return to power after a second purge in 1976 owed much to the support of key military leaders, and Deng, like Mao, recognised the key relationship between political power and 'the barrel of a gun'.
1 Nor was he the only key political leader in the post-Mao era -much of his skill as a political leader was in balancing the conflicting demands and interests of different groups of leaders (Bachman 1986 , 1988 , Dittmer 1990 . Nor was he the personal architect of specific reforms in the economic system, and he did not hold the most important formal positions of power for most of the period from 1978 to his death in February 1997. But in terms of dictating the overall direction of China's political economy and in being a key arbiter of who got promoted and who fell from grace, it is entirely understandable that the first two decades of reform are most associated with Deng Xiaoping.
Two key factors should underpin any understanding of post-Mao China. First, no matter what the party has done in loosening its control over the economy, and to a lesser extent society, loosening party control was never conceived as the road to the end of party rule. On the contrary, loosening control was only countenanced as it was perceived to be the best way of ensuring the party's grip on power.
2 In theory, of course, a communist party only exists as a means to an endto act on behalf of the proletariat to create a classless communist society. But maintaining the party's monopoly on power and the position of its members as societal elites has become an end in itself in China. Mao's alternative strategy for building a revolutionary society might not be palatable, but in many respects he was correct in fearing
